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Abstract. In the Supreme Court case Nielsen v. Preap, ignorance about syntax and
semantics led to tragic consequences. The ACLU lawyer defending thousands of
non-citizens from being rounded up and put into prison indefinitely by ICE let it
come across that her argument rested on the false premise that adverbs can modify
nouns. The textualists claimed victory, even though the humane reading of the text
was the literal one in this case. The final decision rested crucially on this error on
her part, and was buffered by a misunderstanding about how definite descriptions
work. The dissent failed to articulate a convincing rebuttal, making spurious ref-
erence to passive voice. This case clearly shows how staggeringly consequential
linguistic knowledge can be.
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1, Introduction. Nielsen v. Preap was heard in the Supreme Court in October 2018. (I hap-
pened to be teaching a course on language and law at the time.) “Nielsen” refers to US Secretary 
of Homeland Security Kirsten Nielsen, a Trump appointee; “Preap” (first name “Mony”) is a par-
ticular immigrant to the United States. In this story, the Trump administration, represented by 
Kiersten Nielsen, is opposed to Mony Preap and thousands of immigrants like him. Likewise,
fifth grade grammar is opposed to linguistics, and mass imprisonment is opposed to human
rights.
Mony Preap was born in around 1977 in a refugee camp to Cambodian parents who were
escaping the Khmer Rouge, so he is stateless, and therefore cannot be deported. In 1981 he
started living lawfully in the United States. Some years later he served a jail sentence for pos-
session of marijuana, ending in 2006. In 2013 he was taken into federal custody, where he has
remained ever since. In 2018 he was represented in the Supreme Court by the ACLU in this
Supreme Court case, Nielsen v. Preap.
The questions taken up in this case were 1) Was Mony Preap lawfully detained in 2013?
and 2) Can he be released now? The statute under which she was taken into custody is 8 US
Code Sec. 1226 (c). Paragraph 1 of this statute reads as follows (and note that by “alien” what
is meant is a person who is not a citizen or national of the United States, a very broad cate-
gory that includes even green card holders):
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who:
a) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section
1182(a)(2) of this title,
b) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,
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c) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an
offense for which the alien has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
at least 1 year, or
d) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under
section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,
when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on pa-
role, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may
be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.
We can compress this into the following:
(1) Paragraph 1 (abridged)
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who meets any of the criteria 
(a)-(d) when the alien is released.
What does “released” mean? It’s about the custody that the non-citizen was in before, as a
consequence of having been judged guilty of some prior offense. This presupposition is sat-
isfied in the case that condition (c) “is deportable on the basis of an offense for which the
alien, has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least one year” is met. In this case,
it would be when the non-citizen is released from that term of imprisonment. It’s not clear
what to do about cases involving an individual who needs one of criteria (a)-(d) but was never
previously incarcerated. The lawyer for the Trump administration, Zachary Tripp, said when
pressed on this question by Justice Sotomayor, that “in the overwhelming majority of appli-
cations, ... there’s going to have been some prior criminal custody,” and that “that’s really the
paradigm of the statute.” There seems to be a bit of a presupposition failure there, but I will
not be focusing on that particular interesting issue in the interpretation of this statute.
That was Paragraph 1. Paragraph 2 reads roughly as follows:
(2) Paragraph 2 (abridged)
The Attorney General may release an alien described in Paragraph 1, only if the Attor-
ney General decides the release of the alien from custody is necessary to provide protec-
tion to witness or potential witness...
So Paragraph 1 says, “the government shall take into custody any alien who (a)-(d) when the
alien he is released.” Paragraph 2 says that an alien “described in Paragraph 1” may be re-
leased only for witness protection purposes. It is worth noting that although the Trump admin-
istration pressed for the most draconian interpretation of this statute possible, the law dates
back to 1996, under the Clinton administration, and remains in force even now that a new ad-
ministration has taken office. Let us now consider how this law applies to Mony Preap.
2. On the meaning of “when”. Preap’s jail sentence for possession of marijuana ended in
2006. He was taken into federal custody in 2013, and there’s a seven-year gap between 2006
and 2013. So arguably, this is not “when”. During the oral arguments, Justice Alito said to Ce-
cila Wang:
we have to decide whether “when the alien is released” means, as you say, as the
Ninth Circuit said, immediately, within 48 hours, within some reasonable period,
or after the alien is released. In simple terms, that’s the question before us, right?
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The core of the argument that ACLU lawyer Cecilia Wang made before the Supreme Court is
that it means “immediately”. Reasonable people can disagree about what constitutes “when” –
is it the same day? the same week? same month? But seven years later, is not “when”. “When”
implies simultaneity at some reasonable level of granularity. So Preap should not have been
detained in the first place. Furthermore, he is not “described in Paragraph 1”, so Paragraph 2
does not prevent the government from releasing him now. Moreover, he should be released
now.
Alito pointed out that “A shall happen when B” could in principle be paraphrased as either
“A shall happen (more or less) at the same time as B” or “A shall happen at any point dur-
ing the period that B holds true”. What was not pointed out during the oral arguments is that
the difference depends on whether B is eventive (see for example Kamp & Reyle 1993; 656).
If I say, “You shall wave at me when I arrive”, you have not fulfilled your duties by waving
at me three days after I have arrived. But if I say “You shall wave at me when I am at the
beach”, then as long as I am on the beach when you wave at me, then you have fulfilled your
obligation to me. Arriving is an event. Being on the beach is a state. So it makes a difference
whether B is an event or a state what temporal relation should hold between A and B in a sen-
tence of the form “A shall happen when B”. So in the case of “when the alien is released”, the
question has to do with whether “the alien is released” describes an event or a state.
It is tempting to locate the ambiguity in the word “when” (Ms. Wang says, “ ‘when’ con-
notes immediacy; that’s the primary dictionary definition”), but the word “released” is the only
reasonable source of potential ambiguity, as far as I can see. This is the passive form of the
verb “release”, and such passive participles can be used either as adjectives or verbs. A word
like “enlightened”, as in “He is very enlightened” contains a passive participle that is used
as an adjective. “Very” only modifies adjectives. Here “enlightened” describes a state of en-
lightenment. If we read “released” as an adjective, then the “when” clause can be rephrased
as “when the alien is in a state of release (or ‘releasement’)”. If we read it as a verb, then it
means “when the release takes place”; it describes a single event, or happening. This choice –
state or event – determines what temporal relation holds between A and B. If B is a state, then
A can happen any time during B. If B is an event, then “A must happen when B” means that
A must happen at the same time that B happens.
Some passive participles, like “enlightened”, are much more typically used as adjectives.
You can tell that “released” is not normally used as an adjective by trying to make it do things
that only adjectives can do, like modify nouns. It makes sense to talk about “an enlightened
person”, but not “a released person”; I would rather say “a free person”. It is also odd to ask,
“How long have you been released?”; I would rather say “How long have you been out of
jail?” So a construal of “released” as a verbal participle is far more likely.
If it is construed as a verbal participle, then the “when” clause describes an event (of re-
lease), not a state. That means that the taking into custody is characterized as taking place
at the same time as the release. Of course, there is no sharp boundary delineating when two
events have occurred at the same time and when they have not, but 7 years is far beyond the
zone where there is any doubt. Clearly, arresting Mony Preap now does not constitute arresting
him “when [he] is released”, on an eventive construal. The Ninth Circuit court agreed with this
assessment, concluding that the apprehension should take place “with a reasonable degree of
immediacy”.
Even the lawyer for the government, Zachary Tripp, agreed that the text is unambiguous
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in this respect, at least for some of his purposes. In response to a question from Justice So-
tomayor, he said that the statute conveys an “urgency” to take these individuals into custody as
soon as possible.
Tripp argued, in effect, that the statute was written imprecisely. But the literal interpre-
tation is not “when or as soon as possible thereafter”; it’s just “when”. During the hearings,
Kavenaugh presumed that Wang was asking the court to read in “immediately” to the statute,
adding this extra bit of meaning. But that bit is already part of the ordinary meaning of the
statute; it’s not being added. On the contrary, the government (represented by Tripp) wants the
court to read in “or as soon as possible thereafter”. It’s the government who asked the court to
read something into the statute that isn’t there. The government asked the Supreme Court to
give them authority beyond what is written in the statute to go and round people up and deny
them bond hearings.
Maybe Congress even wanted that in 1996 when the statute was written, but they didn’t
ask for it in this particular statute. It is not impossible to imagine Congress did want that in
1996. As Justice Kavenaugh pointed out, “what was going through Congress’s minds in 1996
was harshness”; Congress did indeed want more people incarcerated. But it is also quite plau-
sible that Congress did not intend for this law to lead to a massive hunt for any immigrant
with any criminal background whatsoever, no matter how far in the past. The ACLU lawyer
Cecilia Wang argued that the restriction with the “when” clause was intended to focus the De-
partment of Homeland Security’s resources. Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the “transition
rules” that Congress enacted at the same time would have been superfluous if it had been pos-
sible for the government to comply with the law by waiting as long as they wanted to appre-
hend the non-US citizen.
There are cases where it is justifiable to read in “or as soon as possible thereafter”. One
example brought up by Justice Breyer was the case where a government misses the deadline
for a bond hearing. In that case, even if the government misses the deadline, the person in
question still has a right to the bond hearing. So in this case, it does make sense to read in
“or as soon as possible thereafter”. Justice Breyer said that he asked himself, “Is this like that
case?” and concluded that the answer was no, because here, reading in this extra bit of mean-
ing hurts innocent people, rather than safeguarding their Constitutional rights. Indeed, here, the
extra bit of meaning that would be read in would conflict with the Constitution, which affords
people like Mony Preap the right to a bond hearing.
3. On “described” and what adverbs modify. So far, so good. But Justice Gorsuch posed the
following challenge, addressing Cecilia Wang:
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. You’ve hinged a lot on the language, and you’ve told
us to ignore what’s happened after 1996 and, in response to Justice Sotomayor,
went back to that language, “when the alien is released.”’ But, if we’re going to
focus really carefully on the language, what do we do about the fact that that is an
adverbial phrase? And you’re asking us to suggest that it modifies the noun “alien”
and limits the class of aliens that are involved. “Alien” is a noun. Adverbs don’t
usually modify nouns. They usually modify verbs. And the verb here is “shall take
into custody.” So why isn’t it that the duty, “shall take into custody,” is modified
by the adverb, “when the alien is released,” okay, and so the government’s obli-
gation begins at that moment. We know that’s when the “shall take into custody”
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duty starts. But the class of aliens, the who, the noun, has nothing to do with the
adverb. Now that’s the question my fifth grade grammar teacher would have, all
right? And so I pose it to you.
MS. WANG: Well, I think I’m a grammarian too. The reason why, Justice Gor-
such, is that sometimes adverbial phrases do describe a noun, just as they do in
this statute. So, first, for all the reasons I’ve already said. I –
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Usually, they modify the verb.
MS. WANG: I’ll – I will –
JUSTICE GORSUCH: So let’s start there.
MS. WANG: – I will concede that. Right –
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Why should we – you’re asking us to take a rather unusual
view of grammar, one I think I’d have to delve pretty deep in the footnotes to find.
MS. WANG: It wouldn’t be the –
JUSTICE GORSUCH: So why would I do that?
MS. WANG: It wouldn’t be the first time Congress tortured grammar, but –
JUSTICE GORSUCH: This – this, I won’t argue with you about.
MS. WANG: Right. So – so two – two reasons, Justice Gorsuch. For the reasons
I’ve already said, I think it’s clear from the structure of the statute and the plain
language that Congress meant for people – for – for paragraph (2), to – to de-
scribe a subset of people who were taken into custody in paragraph (1). In all of
paragraph (1), not omitting the flush language, as – as my friend describes it. The
second reason is, yes, it may be uncommon for an adverbial phrase to describe
a noun, but it can happen. Let me give you a hypothetical example that – that –
that tracks this statute. I might tell you in a two-paragraph instruction, number
one, harvest the grapes in vineyards A, B, and C when they ripen. Paragraph two:
Make the wine from the grapes described in paragraph (1). The grapes refer to
both the temporal component, I want you to harvest them when they’re ripe, not
when they’re over-ripe, not when they’re under-ripe, and it’s from those three vine-
yards.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: I’m not sure I – I mean, I follow the example, but I’m not
sure I buy it, and let me tell you why. And it’s a neat example. I commend you.
Well done.
(Laughter.)
JUSTICE GORSUCH: I think – I think my fifth grade grammar teacher would
love this discussion, but I would say to you or I’d challenge you with this, that,
again, there you’re modifying the verb, when you’re supposed 6 to harvest it, okay?
And that’s the first – the first section. The second section, you’re saying, okay,
whatever you’ve harvested, the grapes that we’ve described that you have har-
vested. You still have to have harvested them. So it still depends upon the verb
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in that second paragraph, the verb plus the noun as referred to in the second para-
graph. So I’m not sure it gets around the problem. Help me out.
MS. WANG: I – I guess, Justice Gorsuch, I think another way to put this is that
what the government’s referring to as an adverbial phrase could be rephrased as an
adjective.
Let’s begin by pointing out that Neil Gorsuch is absolutely right that “when” clauses mod-




the grapes from vineyards A-C
when they are ripe
He is also right that in this example “the grapes described in Paragraph 1” are the grapes that 
were harvested, so the content contributed by the verb goes into the characterization of the 
grapes in question. (Moreover, it is the grapes that were harvested when ripe.) This is a key 
point. If, in the 1996 statute, to be “described in Paragraph 1” was simply to be a non-citizen 
meeting any of the criteria (a)-(d), as the Trump administration argues, then to be “described in 
Paragraph 1” in Wang’s grapes example should simply be to be a grape from one of the 
vineyards A-C – not a grape harvested. Thus Gorsuch’s observation here actually supports 
Wang’s objectives. It is not just the grapes from the designated vineyards that are “described in 
Paragraph 1”, as the Trump administration’s legal team would have to say in order to remain 
consistent. Rather, it is the grapes that have undergone a process described in Paragraph 1. 
What this shows, then, is that to be described in Paragraph 1 is to undergo a process depicted 
in Paragraph 1.
Now the question is what kind of process is described in Paragraph 1. The parse that Gor-
such seems to be arguing for is as follows:
(4)
shall
take into custody any alien who (a)-(d)
when the alien is released
Here “when the alien is released” modifies the phrase headed by shall. Since shall is a verb,
and the when-clause is an adverbial phrase, this is syntactically licit, but it doesn’t make much
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sense. Gorsuch suggests that the semantic interpretation we would get from this parse is one
where “the duty begins” when the alien is released. But there is no precedent for a when-
clause specifying the onset of a duty with a strong modal verb like shall. There is no reading
of the following sentence, for example, on which students may open their textbooks any time
after nine:
(5) Students shall open their textbooks when the clock strikes nine.
The only available reading of this sentence is that the textbook-opening must occur at nine.
Another syntactically viable parse—another one in which the adverbial phrase modifies a
verb phrase—is the following:
(6)
shall
take into custody any alien who (a)-(d)
when the alien is released
Here, again, the when-clause modifies a verb phrase, but the verb phrase is headed by take
rather than shall. With this parse, the duty is to perform a certain action at a certain time. It
implies no duties to perform any actions at any other times, in particular any times after the
specified time. This is not only the most reasonable parse, it also implies that the government
had no obligation to take Mony Preap into custody when they did, and provides a key step in
the argument that he should be released now.
At the LSA workshop on statutory interpretation, Neal Goldfarb pointed out another possi-
ble parse, where the when-clause modifies (a)-(d):
(7)
shall
take into custody any
alien
who
(a)-(d) when the alien is released
This would imply a duty to take into custody anyone whose status as inadmissable or de-
portable held at the time that they were released. This would not be good for Mony Preap,
because he would then be in the class of non-citizens for the government to take into custody.
Is it a plausible interpretation? I think not, because (again, as long as the presupposition that
there is something to be released from is met) anyone who is inadmissable or deportable for
803
any of the specified reasons is so when they are released, so the when clause would not help to
further restrict the class of individuals. If the when-clause attaches to the verb, then it specifies
the time at which the action should take place. It may also be relevant that neither Gorsuch
nor either of the lawyers seems to have considered this parse (nor had I).
In contrast, trying to argue that “when the alien is released” modifies the noun and serves
as an adjective is an utterly hopeless enterprise. By making it seem as if her argument rests on
the idea that Congress “tortured grammar”, Cecilia Wang opened herself up to serious objec-
tion, and this may well have lost her the case.
4. How it turned out. The decision was 5-4 against Mony Preap, and thousands like him.
This has massive, enormous consequences. People who must now live their lives in terror of
ICE include non-citizens who stolen some bus transfers over a decade ago. A person could get
rounded up if they live in Washington and state confidently at their green card interview that
they smoke marijuana on a regular basis. It applies to innocent children of people convicted of
terrorism. ICE could detain you at your home, your job, or at your green card interview. Even
green card holders could be imprisoned indefinitely.
Here’s the reasoning that the Supreme Court gave in their opinion.
Since an adverb cannot modify a noun, §1226(c)(1)’s adverbial clause “when . . .
released” does not modify the noun “alien,” which is modified instead by the ad-
jectival clauses appearing in subparagraphs (a)–(d).
Furthermore, they wrote,
The meaning of “described” as it appears in §1226(c)(2)—namely, “to communi-
cate verbally . . . an account of salient identifying features,” Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary... is the relevant definition since the indisputable job of the
“descri[ption] in paragraph (1)” is to “identif[y]” for the Secretary which aliens she
must arrest immediately “when [they are] released.” Yet the “when . . . released”
clause could not possibly describe aliens in that sense.
I do not find this assessment indisputable. On the contrary, it seems to me that the role of the
description in Paragraph 2 is to identify for the government which non-citizens may be re-
leased only for witness protection purposes. Furthermore, the description is not in terms of
salient identifying features but rather in terms of a disjunctive list of abstract criteria.
The dissent (signed by Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) attempted to combat this
line of argumentation using following example:
(8) The well-behaved child was taken by a generous couple to see Hamilton.
They write, “That sentence, written in a passive voice, describes the child, not only as well be-
haved but also as someone taken by a generous couple to see Hamilton.” I agree, but I don’t
think that it’s relevant to bring up the passive voice here. As argued above, I think the key
point is that to be described in Paragraph 1 is to undergo a process described in Paragraph 1,
and this process may be depicted with verbs in active or passive voice. In any case, this was
not sufficient to convince them jury of the error of their ways.
In support of their decision, adding insult to injury, the majority wrote:
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Moreover, Congress’s use the definite article in ‘when the alien is released’ indi-
cates that the scope of the word ‘alien’ has been previously specified in context.
Thus the class of people to whom “the alien” refers must be fixed by the predicate
offenses identified in subparagraphs (a)-(d).
I don’t think they teach this in fifth grade, but definite descriptions can have bound variable
uses. This is discussed, for example, by Elbourne (2005), who discusses the following exam-
ples:
(9) Mary talked to no senator before the senator was lobbied.
‘There is no individual x such that x is a senator and Mary talked to x before x was lob-
bied.’
In fact, the very statute under consideration has a use of ‘the alien’ in exactly this capacity in
conditions (c): “is deportable under the law on the basis of an offense for which the alien has
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least one year”. Here, ‘the alien’ occurs mid-
description. We are not done describing the class of aliens when we have this definite descrip-
tion, ‘the alien’, serving as a bound variable. So this argument is utterly fallacious in a way
that ought to have been recognized.
5. Conclusion. Thousands of people will be rounded up and put into federal prison indefinitely,
all because of linguistic ignorance. Cecilia Wang let it come across that her argument rested 
on the false premise that adverbs can modify nouns, and that was seized upon by the textu-
alists (Alito and Gorsuch) in the decision. The final decision rested crucially on this error on 
her part, and was buffered by a misunderstanding about how definite descriptions work. The 
dissent failed to articulate a convincing rebuttal, making spurious reference to passive voice. 
Ironically, the text was on the side of human rights all along.
What is the way forward? For Mony Preap et al., the only hope is that Congress repeals
the law, as far as I can see. Linguistics has already lost to fifth grade grammar in this arena,
but we can hope that through greater interaction between linguistics and law, it may prevail in
future cases.
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